The question of what doctors ought to do with regard to the cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) of terminally ill patients has recently caused both discussion and anxiety among specialists in palliative care. Guidance from the British Medical Association (BMA), 1 issued in 2001, seems to suggest that doctors have two new duties.
The first is a duty to ask all competent terminally ill patients whether they would like to be resuscitated. BMA guidance states that 'where competent patients are at foreseeable risk of cardiopulmonary arrest, or have a terminal illness, there should be sensitive exploration of their wishes regarding resuscitation'.
The second is a duty to attempt to resuscitate competent but terminally ill patients who want this to be done, even when the doctor's professional judgement indicates that its harms and risks exceed its benefits. The guidance states that 'doctors cannot be required to give treatment contrary to their clinical judgement, but should, whenever possible, respect patients' wishes to receive treatment which carries only a very small chance of success or benefit'. Health care requires judgements about probabilities of benefit balanced against harm. The BMA seems to be suggesting that when patients request CPR doctors ought to attempt it, even though they judge that it is overwhelmingly likely to confer no benefit and only harm.
If we accept these as duties, then there is a clear implication that the ethical basis of decisions regarding resuscitation must be different from the ethical basis of all other treatment decisions. This implication is the cause of our moral disquiet and anxiety.
The ethical process for other treatment decisions is clear, widely accepted and described in professional guidance. 2 In summary, the doctor offers treatment that he or she considers would be in the best interests of the particular patient, that is, would have a reasonable chance of conferring net benefit over harm. The competent and informed patient then makes a choice as to whether to accept or refuse any treatment offered. Incompetent patients are treated according to a judgement by the health care team regarding their best interests, bearing in mind what can be known of what the patient would have wanted.
The BMA makes this process clear in its guidance on withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging medical treatment, 3 where it is stressed that treatment can be given only if justified by expected net benefit to the patient in terms of health: 'The primary goal of medical treatment is to benefit the patient by restoring or maintaining the patient's health as far as possible, maximising benefit and minimising harm. If treatment fails, or ceases, to give a net benefit to the patient (or if the patient has competently refused the treatment) that goal cannot be realised and the justification for providing the treatment is removed.' This statement is repeated at the beginning of the guidance on CPR decisions. Compare this general model with the suggested model for decision making regarding resuscitation. First, in terms of the suggested new model doctors are obliged to ask patients if they would like a certain treatment -CPR. But if one is asking patients if they would like a particular treatment, there is an inescapable implication that one is prepared to provide it. In many cases in palliative care, however, this would mean that doctors must be prepared to provide a treatment which they know is overwhelmingly likely to provide no benefit (since the attempt would not succeed), and instead is overwhelmingly likely confer harm on the patient. As such, it cannot be in the patient's best interests. The proposal of such a duty runs completely contrary to our moral beliefs about doctors' responsibilities in decision making, and contrary to professional guidance about treatment in general.
Secondly, it is important to note that patients undergoing CPR are necessarily incompetent to consent to it at the time when it might be appropriate. This is relevant in two ways.
The first is that when patients are asked whether or not they want CPR, they are being asked to make an advance statement. Where other treatment decisions are concerned, we may enable and encourage patients to make advance statements but we do not insist that they do so. The BMA states 'Ideally, decisions about whether to resuscitate a particular patient are made in advance as part of overall care planning for that patient, and, as such, are discussed with the patient along with other aspects of future care.' Thus where resuscitation is concerned, the right to make an advance statement has become a duty.
The second point of relevance is that doctors' duties to incompetent patients are to act in the patients' best interests. This point is emphasized in health care ethics and in British law. According to this principle doctors cannot be required to provide a treatment that they believe will confer overall harm on the patient. Yet the BMA seem to be recommending that doctors should be willing to offer and thus provide resuscitation where they know the overwhelming probability is that it will provide no net benefit and will be harmful, so it cannot be in the patient's interests.
From this discussion it is clear that the two duties proposed by the BMA in its recent guidance on resuscitation are incompatible with the rest of UK guidance on health care ethics and UK law. Moreover, BMA guidance may also be contrary to the Human Rights Act 2000 (Article 3), since it appears to recommend subjecting terminally ill patients to a non-beneficial, aggressive and arguably degrading and inhuman treatment.
Other sections of the BMA guidance recommend that terminally ill patients should not be subjected to attempted resuscitation. They note that 'If the health care team is as certain as it can be that attempting CPR would not restart the patient's heart and breathing, the patient cannot gain any clinical benefit from an attempt.'
Doctors are likely to have considerable difficulty in interpreting the recent guidance on resuscitation from the BMA for three reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent and even contradictory. For example, in their summary of legal issues the BMA appears to combine in one sentence two apparently contradictory ideas: 'Neither patients nor relatives can demand treatment which the health care team judges to be inappropriate, but all efforts will be made to accommodate wishes and preferences' (my italics). Secondly, in many places it runs contrary to guidance on making all other health care decisions. Finally, it appears to recommend the provision of useless and harmful resuscitation attempts for dying patients. Yet from this guidance it is intended that institutions, including hospital trusts, hospices and nursing homes, will formulate their own resuscitation policy.
Perhaps the biggest problem is that currently throughout health care there is a pervasive lack of clarity about who is responsible for treatment decisions. The simple facts are that a competent patient can refuse a treatment and a doctor can refuse to provide a treatment which he or she judges is not in the patient's best interests.
Much of the confusion arising from the guidance could have been avoided if it had recommended that where patients are terminally ill, then in the course of disclosures about their prognosis, it should be explained that when their heart and breathing stops as a result of their illness, then attempted resuscitation would be overwhelmingly likely to fail. In the light of that, doctors and nurses would not and should not attempt it, but instead would allow and enable a peaceful death.
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